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Abstract: We use the portfolio theory to analyze the lawyer's decision regarding the 
type of case the lawyer will handle. We offer some insights into the widespread idea that 
contingency lawyers are providing a risk sharing service. We demonstrate that a 
contingent fee lawyer diversifies his portfolio. We show that reputation induces more, but 
not fully, concentration, since a lawyer with greater reputation or expertise selects more 
risky cases. The size of the law firm has the same result.
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LAWYER'S DECISION OF HANDLING LEGAL CLAIM?
INTRODUCTION
Lawyer fee arrangements are subject to a current debate. Contingent fees are widely 
used in the United States, but are banned or regulated in many other countries (Great 
Britain, France). In those countries, clients generally paid their lawyer at an hourly fee or 
a fixed fee. The standard description of the contingent fees is no win, no pay: the lawyer 
receives a fixed percentage of the amount recovered from the other side if the case is 
won; he receives nothing if the case is lost. Literature on contingent fees is by no means 
new and has offered several economics explanations pro and con contingent fees. 
Several articles have emphasized benefits from allowing the use of contingent fees. 
Tying the lawyer's fees to the recovery induces the lawyer to exert an efficient level of 
effort. Contingent fees are a response to a moral hazard problem1. They may also be a 
response to asymmetric information between the plaintiff and the lawyer2. In other 
articles, contingent fees are criticized. They are supposed to provide incentives for 
lawyers to settle cases earlier than clients would wish. Contingent fees are assumed to 
spur frivolous litigation, since lawyers accept cases with little legal merit3. In summary, 
the literature concludes that depending on details of the case, either an hourly or a 
contingent fee system can be the best.
In this article, we do not try to resolve the debate about which explanation of 
contingent fees is the most accurate. We propose an analysis of the contingency fee
lawyer as a portfolio manager. In the portfolio theory, an investor decides whether or not 
to acquire an asset with uncertain rate of return. Thinking in terms of the portfolio model,
lawyers have to evaluate potential cases in terms of the risks involved and the potential 
returns from the case in order to decide whether or not to drop it. We search for how 
much time a lawyer will invest in a particular case. Contingency lawyers have to hold a 
portfolio of cases so as to hedge the risks they are taking on...they are allocating their 
time based on which cases will produce greater value on margin4. In doing so, lawyers 
control the flow of cases into the legal market.
This paper employs the opportunity cost approach rather than explicitly including the 
lawyer's cost of effort. Most papers in this literature assume that the lawyer works on 
1 See Murray L Schwartz & Daniel J. B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal 
Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV., 1125-62 (1970); Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury 
Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON., 213-24 (1983).
2 See James D. Dana & Kathryn Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information 
in Attorney Compensation, 9 J. L. ECON. & ORG., 349-67 (1993); Suzanne Scotchmer & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Contingent Fees for Attorney: An Economic Analysis, 24 RAND J. ECON., 343-356 (1990).
3 See Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INTER. REV. L. & 
ECON., 3-27 (1990); Thomas J. Miceli, Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?, 23 J. LEG. STUDIES 211-
224 (1994).
4
 Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. 
L. REV., 953-1006 (2000).
one case and the cost of effort into that case is given by some parameter proportional to 
the amount of effort devoted into that case. Instead of taking the conventional approach, 
we take more realistic route by saying that the cost of effort putting into one case comes 
precisely from being prohibited from working on another case, given the total labor/hour 
constraint. Using opportunity cost creates a correlation between cases. By selecting a 
risky case the lawyer rejects the riskless case and vice versa.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we set out the basic model 
based on the idea that lawyers resemble portfolio managers. Section 3 discusses the 
hourly fee arrangement and considers the law firm's behavior. Section 4 provides a brief 
conclusion. All proofs are in appendix.
I- A SIMPLE MODEL
Kritzer5 discusses three elements of risk facing lawyers: liability risk, quantum risk 
and effort risk. Liability risk concerns the variation in the likelihood of verdicts favouring 
plaintiffs. Quantum risk speaks of uncertainty on the amount that will be recovered. Even 
if there is no uncertainty about whether the plaintiff (and so the lawyer) will win, 
uncertainty probably remains with regard to damages. Effort risk refers to the uncertainty 
over the amount of time the case actually looks. According to three studies6, Kritzer7
exhibits that the probability of success was almost always lowest in medical malpractice. 
Datas collected by the Civil Litigation Research Project show that the risk that a lawyer 
receives no fee is higher in federal cases (26% of the cases) than in state cases (17%). 
Torts and contract cases involve less liability risk (17%) than do cases involving other 
types of issues (38%). Uncertainty regarding damages is more difficult to assess. 
Kritzer8 proposes to measure quantum risk by computing a ratio of recovery to stakes. 
Stakes was defined as the lawyer's assessment of what a reasonable settlement would
have been. His results exhibit that the risk in tort and contract cases is similar but less 
than the risk in other cases. So, we can reasonably assume that there exist different 
types of cases which differ from each other according to the associated risk. There may 
be routine cases in which the risk is small or null (auto accident cases or security social 
cases, for example), and there may be risky cases (medical malpractice cases, for 
example).
We assume a risk-averse lawyer with an initial wealth of 100$. To capture the risk 
aversion we shall assume that an award of 10$ gives to the lawyer a utility of log(10) = 
2.3. He has to share his working time, say 1 hour, between two legal claims: a risk-free 
case and a risky case.
5
 Herbert Kritzer, Rhetoric and Reality...Uses and Abuses...Contingencies and Certainties: the American 
Contingent Fee in Operation, Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper 12-2 (1996).
6 See Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting Myths about Jury Incompetence, 
Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage awards, 49-92 (1995); Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to decide Liability in 
Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMO. L. J., 885-894
(1994).
7 See source cited supra note 4.
8 See source cited supra note 4.
A case is characterized by two elements: the probability of prevailing at court and 
the amount of the recovery. In other words, a case combines liability risk and quantum 
risk.
We shall consider that the awards of both cases depend on the time devoted by the 
lawyer. The risk free case award is given by (number of hours)×900$. This award is 
certain. The risky case award is given by (number of hours)×R×2000$ with R > 1. The 
parameter R reduces variance and increases expected reward of risky case. It may 
reflect two ways in which cases interrelate. The first is the impact of reputation9. A 
second way may be the lawyer's own expertise. Let us consider that R = 2. We shall 
consider that the probability of prevailing the risky case is 60%10.
We shall assume that the market for lawyers is competitive11.
Under a contingent fee arrangement, the lawyer receives a percentage of the 
recovery and bears 100% of the cost. This corresponds to the dominant form of 
contingent fee used in United-States. Most datas indicate (Survey of lawyers handling 
cases in the federal district court conducted by RAND Corporation, survey conducted by 
the Alaska Judicial Council) that contingency fees are far from uniform. Only about 50-
60 percent of fees are one-third. Some datas sets point out fees exceeding one-third 
and fees less than-third12.
To simplify, we assume that the lawyer charges the same percentage 30% for both 
risky and riskless legal claims.
The lawyer will choose the allocation of his working time between risky and riskless 
legal claims to maximize his expected utility. If he decides to allocate all his working time 
on the riskless project, his award is (1 hour)×30% ×900$ = 270$. His wealth is 270$ + 
100$ = 370$, which gives him a utility of 5.91. If he decides to devote all his time to the 
risky case, his award is (1 hour)×30% ×R×2000$ = 1200$ if he wins. Hence, his wealth if 
he wins is 1200$ + 100$ = 1300$ and 100$ if he looses, i.e. his initial wealth. His utility 
is 6.14. Suppose now that he shares equally his time, his utility becomes 6.22. 
Therefore, the lawyer is better off when he engages in diversification by handling a mix 
of cases.
The following graphic shows his expected utility for all time allocation. We see that 
the optimal time allocation is to devote 66% of the working time to risky legal claims.
9
 Herbert Kritzer, Risks, reputations, and rewards: contingency fee legal practice in the United States, 
Stanford University Press  (2004) (asserting that reputation is important as a form of correlation among 
investments...correlation arises both from the kinds of cases the lawyer is able to put into the portfolio and from the 
amount of time the lawyer has to invest in those cases to obtain a return).
10
 It would be more accurate to consider that the probability of prevailing the risky cases depends on the 
time devoted by the lawyer: more time devoted on the risky case increases the probability that the case will be won. 
Since the outcome at court is never entirely determined by the actions of the lawyers (the result depends on random 
events such as the assignment of a judge), this design would allow us to reflect the unpredictably of law. This 
assumption would not affect qualitatively our conclusions.
11 Many scholars have advanced the view that the market for lawyers and legal services is competitive. See 
e.g., Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2088-89 (2002). Nevertheless, this 
assessment is a much debated question. See e.g., source cited supra note 8; Lester Brickman, The Market for 
Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CAR. L. REV. 65-128 (2003).
12
 Barry Meier, Lawyer's Foundation Awash in Questions, NEW YORK TIMES, February 7 (1997).
The lawyer chooses a mix of routine cases which are riskless (low but certain 
payoffs) and riskier cases which result in high payoffs. This strategy allows him to 
engage in a kind of hedging: low risk cases cover the overhead but the high risk fees 
produce the profits. The number of hours devoted to risky legal claim is such that the 
marginal cost related to the additional risky claim, in other words the loss related to the 
riskless claim that is not handled, is equal to the marginal benefit from the additional 
risky claim.
Reputation and the level of contingent fees have important implications for how the 
lawyer devotes his time. A lawyer with a higher reputation devotes more time on risky 
case. More reputation increases the award of the risky case, which induces the lawyer to
devote more time on this case.
Change in the contingency percentages modifies also the allocation of time. This 
change may come from change in the market structure or this can be the government or 
the bar association, which fixes the percentages and decides to change them. The effect 
of this change is straightforward: an increase in the risky (riskless) contingent fee 
induces the lawyer to select more risky (riskless) cases.
However, any same change in both contingency percentages involves opposite 
effects on the allocation of time since it renders both the riskless and risky cases more 
attractive. The lawyer is both induced to increase his working time on both cases but he 
cannot because of his time constraint. The award of the riskless case being greater 
increases his certain wealth, as an increase in his initial wealth. Hence, he becomes less 
risk averse and he is more interested by risky cases. Moreover, the expected award of 
the risky case also increases. Finally, he will devote more times on risky cases.
Expected utility
0
% of hours devoted to 
the risky legal claim100%66%
II- DISCUSSION
A- HOURLY FEE
Contingent fees are widely used in the United States, but are banned or regulated in 
many other countries (Great Britain, France). In those countries, clients generally paid 
their lawyer at an hourly fee or a fixed fee. We now consider the lawyer's decision 
regarding how many hours he devotes to risky case under hourly fee arrangement. 
Under this arrangement, the lawyer is paid for his time regardless of the outcome of the 
case. The lawyer bears no risk.
It is straightforward that under hourly fee arrangement, the lawyer fully concentrates 
his portfolio of legal claims on cases that offers the higher fees. Due to the fully 
concentration, one type of plaintiff is excluded of the legal market.
The advantage of contingent fees is that they ensure that no plaintiff is excluded 
from the lawyers’ market. Indeed, even if characteristics of riskless and risky cases are 
such that the lawyer fully concentrates his portfolio13, then the government or the bar 
association can differentiate fees for risky and riskless legal claims to ensure that no 
plaintiff is excluded.
B- LAW FIRM
One characteristic of the legal market is the coexistence of variety of forms and 
structures of law firms. Clark14 separates law firms into four categories: solo practitioner 
including small law firms (up to five lawyers), middle-sized law firms running from six 
lawyers to fifty, and large firms having over fifty lawyers. The solo or small practitioner 
must develop a strategy for client development. Concerns of reputation and advertising 
are options. Large law firms handle diversified problems from domestic relations, real 
estate and personal injury to problems in international trade, intellectual property or
environmental torts. Middle-sized firms often do labor and employment, larger personal 
injury, as medical malpractice. It seems to exist a specialization of firms according to 
their size. Nevertheless, inside a category, we may assume the existence of different 
kinds of legal claims according to the associated risk. All antitrust claim or divorce does 
not involve the same risk.
Obviously, management of portfolio will be different depending on the size of the law 
firm. By assuming that larger law firms can achieve more economies of scale or 
synergies, these two features will increase the initial wealth.
The more realistic approach of the risk aversion considers that richer people are less 
risk averse than poorer ones. Hence, with a higher initial wealth, a law firm is less risk 
averse and hence is less reluctant to support risky legal claims. As it might be expected, 
larger law firms devote more time on risky cases. It follows that larger law firm handle 
13
e.g., this can be the case when the award of riskless cases are sufficiently high compared to the risky 
cases’ one.
14 See Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to the American Legal Profession in the Year 2000, 33 SUFFOLK L. 
REV. 293 (2000).
more risky cases than smaller law firm. This conclusion corresponds to the observations 
made by Clark15.
CONCLUSION
The contribution of the paper is to model the idea that the lawyer represents a 
portfolio of cases. We study the selection of cases for inclusion in the portfolio when 
cases interrelate in two ways. First, we use an opportunity cost approach, that is time 
devoted to a case is no more available to another case. Second, we introduce a 
parameter, which reflects the impact of reputation. In this framework, we show that a 
contingent fee lawyer diversifies his portfolio by handling a mix of cases. Conversely, an
hourly fee lawyer fully concentrates his portfolio by handling only one type of cases. 
Consequently, one type of plaintiff is locked out the legal market.
Another contribution of the paper is to study the role of reputation. As mentioned 
above, reputation is important as a form of correlation between cases. Reputation has a 
second role as a form of incentives constraint. We show that reputation induces more, 
but not fully, concentration, since a lawyer with greater reputation or expertise selects 
more risky cases. The size of the law firm has the same effect.
Measures to limit contingent fees are likely to have most impact on the routine cases 
rather than on the risky cases since under contingent fees, the flow of cases into the 
legal market is more diversified. No type of claim is left outside the legal market.
15 See supra note 14.
